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A B S T R A C T
Anthropogenic inﬂuence on the climate – and possible societal responses to it – offers a unique window
through which to examine the way people think about and relate to the natural world. This paper reports
data from four, one-day deliberative workshops conducted with members of the UK public during early
2012. The workshops focused on geoengineering – the deliberate, large-scale manipulation of the
planetary environment – as one of three possible responses to climate change (alongside mitigation and
adaptation). Here, we explore one of the most pervasive and wide-ranging themes to emerge from the
workshops: whether geoengineering represented an unprecedented human intervention into ‘nature’,
and what the moral consequences of this might be. Using the concept of ‘messing with nature’ as an
analytical lens, we explore public perceptions of geoengineering. We also reﬂect on why ‘messing with
nature’ was such a focal point for debate and disagreement, and whether the prospect of geoengineering
may reveal new dimensions to the way that people think about the natural world, and their relationship
to it.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Over the course of millennia, the way that people have imagined
and perceived the natural world has changed repeatedly and often
dramatically (Williams, 1972). Shifting belief systems have provided
vastly different ﬁlters through which people have come to
understand the relationship between society and ‘nature’ (Franklin,
2002). New socio-technical developments, both ancient and
modern, have often acted as foci for disputes and contestations
about the impacts of human activity on the natural world
(Macnaghten and Urry, 1998). Developments such as Genetically
Modiﬁed Organisms (GMOs) and nanotechnology are particularly
imbued with potential for changing the way society interacts with
nature (Shaw, 2002). Geoengineering – the term used to describe
large scale technologies that could counteract the effects of climate
change – is the latest in a series of emergent technologies to raise§ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.06.002serious questions about whether, and to what extent, societies’
activities ‘mess’, ‘tinker’ or ‘ﬁddle’ with nature (Shaw, 2002; Davies
and Macnaghten, 2010). In this paper, we seek to reﬂect on the views
of members of the British general public regarding geoengineering
and the implications for how society relates to nature.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, we provide a brief outline of the
multiple and often contrasting ways in which scholars and
commentators have conceptualised our relationship with the
natural world, including a discussion of how anthropogenic
climate change (and possible responses to it) offers a unique
window on how people think about ‘nature’. We then summarise
what is known about public perceptions of geoengineering,
explaining why the perceived naturalness of certain geoengineer-
ing proposals–like other emerging technologies before them –
plays an important role in people’s views.
Next, we provide an analysis of four deliberative workshops
held with members of the general public during the ﬁrst half of
2012, using the concept of ‘messing with nature’ as a lens for
extracting a subset of the data, relating the ﬁndings from these
workshops to previous empirical and theoretical work that has
sought to understand how people conceive of, and relate to
nature. Finally, we conclude by offering some reﬂections on
how geoengineering may add yet more dimensions to the way
that people think about their relationship to the natural world,
and what this might mean for discourses about nature in the
future.hts reserved.
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2.1. Society and ‘nature’
The question of how people relate to, and conceptualise ‘nature’
is deep-rooted and multi-faceted (FitzSimmons, 1989; Franklin,
2002; Macnaghten and Urry, 1998; Murphy, 1994; Williams,
1972). There is no single, straightforward way that nature is
understood in everyday language. It is used to describe green
spaces of ecological value (i.e., parks, forests, grass and trees),
anything that is not directly of human creation (where the crucial
distinction is between natural and artiﬁcial), and much more
besides.
Ideas about what the natural world means, and where we see
our place in it, have changed repeatedly over centuries of human
development (Dryzek, 1997; Murphy, 1994; Williams, 1972). The
ancient Greeks were among the ﬁrst civilisations to posit that there
could be a singular entity – nature – that captured the huge variety
of non-human phenomena that people observed around them
(Macnaghten and Urry, 1998). This did not mean that nature was
well-understood, but it was considered something understandable,
and by extension, potentially measureable and malleable to
human inﬂuence. Indeed, one of the enduring Greek myths is
that of Prometheus, who stole ﬁre from the God Zeus permitting
humans to shape nature in a way that had previously been the
domain of the Gods.
Interpretations and uses of the word ‘nature’ are historically
and culturally speciﬁc. As Enlightenment thinking and the
scientiﬁc method swept through Western societies, followed by
the Industrial Revolution and all that it entailed for social processes
and technological sophistication, the idea of nature as something
mysterious and un-knowable changed rapidly. In its place, a more
mechanistic concept was born: nature as a set of laws, rules and
processes that could be observed, learnt, harnessed – and perhaps
even controlled. As ‘man’ became separate from nature through the
formulation of ‘natural laws’, the doctrine of human exceptional-
ism gained popularity: that humans are fundamentally different
from, and superior to other species. In contrast, the Romantic
movement’s emphasis on nature as pure, pristine and original was
a direct response to the increasingly popular empiricism of the
Enlightenment (Macnaghten and Urry, 1998), and has informed
ecological philosophies ever since.
While human exceptionalism has become dominant in many
Western societies, prior to the second half of the seventeenth
century, the distinction between ‘animate’ and ‘inanimate’ objects
was not even recognised (Hamilton, 2010). Similarly, the idea that
‘nature’ means ‘the natural environment’ is a relatively recent idea
(Macnaghten and Urry, 1998). For some, nature has come to be
equated with an environment that is under attack, can be
measured and sustained, and needs protection. The New Ecological
Paradigm (NEP – see Dunlap et al., 2000, for discussion) is an
attitudinal scale aimed at capturing the apparently paradigmatic
shift in public views about nature in the 1970s, as an awareness of
the global (and potentially highly damaging) effects of human
activities became clearer. The general principles on which the
environmentalist philosophy is based are widely endorsed in
surveys that measure environmental values (De Groot and Steg,
2008 – and see Yearley, 1992, or Cotgrove, 1982, for a discussion of
the relationship between the environmental movement and
Enlightenment ‘rationality’).
Dryzek (1997) has described the seeming shift in the way that
people conceptualised nature (and their relation to it) during the
1970s as indicative of a ‘survivalist’ narrative, drawing on the
rhetoric and terminology of the ‘Limits to Growth’ report released by
the Club of Rome in 1972 (Meadows et al., 1972). The limits to
growth thesis – put crudely, that inﬁnite economic and populationgrowth cannot be sustained on a planet of ﬁnite physical resources –
was one of several key publications that were considered to mark
a new level of engagement with the natural environment (see also
Carson, 1962), and the underlying logic has continued to be used
as conceptual tool for examining the human relationship to the
natural world. In fact, recent attempts to deﬁne modern history as
the ‘anthropocene’ re-invoke the limits to growth concept but
express it through much more precisely calculated (and ecolog-
ically grounded) boundaries and parameters (Zalasiewicz et al.,
2008, 2011), while the imaginations of technologists and
scientists has repeatedly been ﬁred by the prospect of transcend-
ing the limits of the natural world (e.g., Drexler, 1986)
Castree (2001) asserts there are three ‘typologies’ of nature:
External nature – whereby ‘nature is external to, and different from
society’; Intrinsic nature – where nature is ‘an inherent and
essential quality’ of something; and Universal nature - where
nature is seen as encompassing everything there is, including
humans. Hansen (2006) notes that nature can be characterised as
good and pure (i.e. pristine), as vulnerable and threatened (i.e.
degraded), as a threat itself (e.g., natural disasters), as a challenge
(e.g., mountainous terrain), and also as a force not to be tinkered,
tampered or otherwise interfered with. Nature is sometimes seen
not as ‘natural’, but as having been created to be natural (Stepan,
1991 cited from Gregory, 2001) – indicative of a conceptual
progression in human geography and environmental sociology
that challenges the idea that it is even possible to talk about
‘nature’ as independent from our experience of it (Castree and
Braun, 2001; FitzSimmons, 1989; Franklin, 2002; Irwin, 2001;
Macnaghten and Urry, 1998). According to this perspective, ‘nature
is social nature’ (Cloke et al., 1996, p. 534).
However, even this attempt at broadening out the concept of
nature has attracted criticisms. Whilst important, it is only one –
not the – conceptualisation of nature (Dickens, 1996), and many
scholars have expressed concerns that viewing nature through the
lens of social constructionism promotes an overly abstracted level
of theorisation. Theoretical stances on nature continue to evolve,
but for the purposes of the current discussion, the message is clear:
nature is constructed, socially and politically, in many different
ways and for many different purposes making it a ‘‘powerful and
ﬂexible construct in virtually any public debate or controversy’’
(Hansen, 2006, p. 813).
2.2. Nature and emergent technologies
One area in which the relationship between society and the
natural world has played a particularly central role is emerging
technologies – both in terms of how the public perceive them, and
the dominant narratives in media coverage and stakeholder
debates or contestation. Because some new technologies alter or
mediate the way that people interact with their natural
environment, they have frequently acted as lightning rods for
debates about appropriate levels of human intervention in natural
processes (see e.g., Sjo¨berg, 2000).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that agricultural biotechnology
literally involves manipulating the genetic structure of plants (a
highly iconic representation of ‘nature’), concerns about messing
with nature have been central to debates about genetically
modiﬁed (GM) crops, as well as the cloning of animals. For
example, in a Eurobarometer survey reported by Gaskell et al.
(2000), a majority of respondents (both supporters and opponents
of biotechnology) agreed that GM crops and animal cloning
‘threaten the natural order’ and (despite potential beneﬁts) are
‘fundamentally unnatural’.
Durant et al. (1996) analysed media coverage and public
understanding of the Human Genome Project, and identiﬁed two
competing discourses – one of hope, and one of fear. The discourse
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scientists playing God, abusing their knowledge, and interfering
with nature. Similarly, an analysis of public dialogue around GM
crops in the UK found that concerns about the unnaturalness of GM
– and of scientists ﬁddling, tampering with, or otherwise
inappropriately interacting with nature – were central and
recurring concerns. In a review of the language and metaphors
used in newspaper coverage of genetics and biotechnology from
the 1980s through to 2003, Hansen (2006) found that references to
‘nature’ would frequently serve the purpose of linguistically
identifying a clear, agreed upon boundary between that which is
natural and ‘good’, and that which is un-natural and therefore open
to question, or potentially wrong, immoral or unethical.
Nanotechnologies offer another pertinent example of the
complex and dynamic way in which the boundaries between
natural and non-natural processes are construed by scientists,
policy makers, civil society organisations and publics. Offering the
potential to ‘engineer’ at a sub-molecular level, analyses of the
views of members of the public have identiﬁed concerns about
blurring the distinction between natural (or religious) creation,
and human control (Pidgeon et al., 2009; Scheufele et al., 2009). For
example, the DEEPEN project identiﬁed ﬁve cultural narratives that
characterised participants’ responses to nanotechnology. One of
these narratives – messing with nature – revolved around the idea
that nanotechnologies violated a boundary between the natural
and the artiﬁcial that should not be crossed (Davies and
Macnaghten, 2010).
To understand views about nanotechnologies – like other
emerging areas of specialist science with signiﬁcant social and
ethical implications – it is critical to understand the way in which
people relate them to nature (Vandermoere et al., 2010). Perhaps the
ultimate indication, though, of the intertwined relationship between
society, technology and nature is anthropogenic climate change.
2.3. Climate change, geoengineering and the ‘end of nature’
As the evidence of anthropogenic inﬂuence on the climate has
grown ever-stronger (IPCC, 2007), so ‘climate change’ has evolved
from a technical term – primarily of interest to scientists and policy
makers – to a social, moral and political issue that has attracted a
huge amount of media coverage (Boykoff, 2007), public interest
(e.g., Spence et al., 2010) and social contestation (Hulme, 2009).
Climate change – fundamentally a question of human impact on
and inﬂuence over the natural world – is one of the deﬁning
challenges of the 21st century.
More than 20 years ago, the environmentalist Bill McKibben
published a book titled ‘The End of Nature’ (McKibben, 1970).
McKibben’s argument, put simply, was that natural systems could
no longer be considered independent from human inﬂuence. The
impacts of the industrial revolution had grown steadily as they had
become more globalised, and what might once have constituted
relative local processes, with relatively local impacts (and in a pre-
globalised world, very little chance of comparing ‘local’ conditions
to those elsewhere), now operated on an international scale, with
international effects. More recently McKibben noted, anthropo-
genic climate change marked a deﬁnitive shift in how humans
inﬂuenced the natural world: global systems were now funda-
mentally linked to choices made by human societies.
‘‘By the end of nature I do not mean the end of the world. The
rain will still fall and the sun shine, though differently than
before. When I say ‘nature’ I mean a certain set of human ideas
about the world and our place in it.’’ (McKibben, 2003, p7).
Whilst many (e.g. Macnaghten and Urry, 1998) have argued that
nature has never been independent from human activity, McKib-
ben’s thesis is provocative. Geoengineering – the deployment oflarge-scale technologies to counteract the effects of climate change –
potentially takes McKibben’s ideas a step further (Corner, 2013). If
the relatively recent human capacity to impact on natural systems at
a global scale really does represent a distinct phase in human–nature
relations (i.e. the ‘anthropocene’ – Zalasiewicz et al., 2011), then the
prospect of geoengineering seems to add another conceptual leap. In
a geoengineered world, nature is more than co-dependent on human
activity – it is actively shaped, managed and controlled by it on an
unprecedented scale.
In a relatively short period of time, geoengineering has moved
from being a fairly obscure ﬁeld of academic inquiry to an issue on
the agenda of mainstream scientists, policy makers, and civil
society groups–if not yet most members of the public (Royal
Society, 2009; Corner, Pidgeon et al., 2012). Despite the long
history of interest – from academics, the military and policy
makers – in technologies for controlling the weather (Fleming,
2010), the idea that the climatic system could be intentionally
manipulated as a policy response to anthropogenic climate change
has only recently begun to attract serious attention.
The term geoengineering refers to a vast array of existing and
putative technologies, which often have few features in common.
Some of the technologies are familiar, but many have never been
tested on a meaningful scale. The only link between these
technologies is that they all have the potential to be deployed in
order to control or alter the Earth’s climate. Proposals for
geoengineering technologies are frequently grouped into two
broad categories – those that seek to remove carbon dioxide from
the atmosphere (Carbon Dioxide Removal – CDR), and those that
would reﬂect a proportion of sunlight back into space, in order to
reduce solar radiation (Solar Radiation Management – SRM). There
are many hugely signiﬁcant uncertainties about the technical
feasibility of geoengineering proposals (Royal Society, 2009;
United States Government Accountability Ofﬁce, 2011). But as
with other emerging technologies before them, geoengineering
proposals are likely to act as a catalyst for wider societal debates
that reﬂect much more than simply an evaluation of the physical
risks or beneﬁts a particular technology may possess (Corner and
Pidgeon, 2010; Rosa and Clarke, 1999; Walls et al., 2005).
Geoengineering is just the latest in a long line of technological
developments that speak to the concept of nature, and how humans
relate to it. Historians of science have observed how controversies
regarding nuclear power (i.e. the risks of radioactive waste and the
dangers of weaponisation) can be regarded as centring on nuclear
power’s capacity to violate the order of nature (e.g., Weart, 1988),
and culturally deep-seated ideas about poisoning and contamina-
tion (Sjo¨berg, 2000). But as the tools and technologies we have
developed for intervening in and manipulating the natural world
have become ever more powerful, the stakes have risen. Where once
a debate about society and its technologies ‘overstepping’ a
boundary would involve fairly localised concerns–for example,
over-intensive farming methods, the cleanliness of a park, or even a
‘localised’ radioactive leak – a globalised economy and exponential
advances in technological capacity now offers the possibility of
interfering with nature at a global scale.
Nerlich and Jaspal (2012) analysed the emerging language used
in news articles to describe geoengineering and found that it was
dominated by three overarching metaphors: the planet as a body,
the planet is a machine, and the planet is a patient/addict. Within
each of these metaphors are assumptions – or social ‘imaginaries’ –
that speak directly to the way in which humans and the natural
world are related, and how this is symbolically represented in our
language, laws, values and cultural conventions (see, e.g.,
Macnaghten, 2010). Should we care for our body? Fix the machine?
Treat the patient? Similarly, in a review of the different framings
that studies aimed at appraising geoengineering (technically or
socially) have adopted, Bellamy et al. (2012) found that the two
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climatic emergency, and as a ‘plan B’ response to insufﬁcient
mitigation. Central, therefore, to the way that the topic of
geoengineering is ﬁltering into popular discourse, is the idea that
the relationship between humans and the natural world has
reached crisis point, and that geoengineering may be the only
option left (also see Scott, 2012).
It is not difﬁcult to see why ‘messing with nature’ might play a
central role in shaping public perceptions of geoengineering
(Hamilton, 2011; Preston, 2012). Several studies have already
suggested that concerns about the way in which geoengineering
may represent an unprecedented intervention into natural
processes (and what the moral consequences of this might be)
are one determinant of how people view proposed geoengineering
technologies.
In the limited number of countries where research on public
perceptions has been conducted, awareness of the term ‘geoengi-
neering’, and knowledge about what it means is low, and does not
appear to have increased over the past ﬁve years (Corner et al.,
2012). Research has suggested that there may be a positive
correlation between concern about climate change and favour-
ability towards geoengineering (Pidgeon et al., 2012), a general
tendency to favour CDR approaches over SRM technologies (Ipsos-
MORI, 2010), and a relationship between the social, political and
moral views that people hold and their views on geoengineering,
with those who express more ‘individualistic’ worldviews more
likely to hold positive views about geoengineering (Bellamy and
Hulme, 2011; Kahan et al., 2012). People also tend to make a
distinction between research and deployment – with both
quantitative survey data (Mercer et al., 2011) and qualitative
ﬁndings (Ipsos-MORI, 2010; Pidgeon et al., 2013) suggesting that
people are open to the idea of researching geoengineering, while
holding signiﬁcant reservations about ever deploying it (see also
Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013).
In a series of structured discussion groups conducted with
members of the public in 2010, titled ‘Experiment Earth?’ (Ipsos-
MORI, 2010), some illuminating insights into what informed public
opinion on geoengineering may look like were identiﬁed (see also
Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013; Parkhill and Pidgeon, 2011;
Pidgeon et al., 2013). Participants raised serious concerns about the
safety of SRM technologies, and a strong preference for more
conventional, mitigation options over geoengineering techniques
tended to be expressed. Of primary interest for the present paper,
‘naturalness’ (and the extent to which different geoengineering
technologies were perceived as ‘interfering’ in nature) was an
important determinant of public perceptions (a ﬁnding supported
by Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013). Certain geoengineering
proposals – like the use of biochar, or afforestation – were seen as
more natural, and therefore more acceptable, than others (such as
the use of stratospheric aerosols to reﬂect sunlight), tallying with
survey data suggesting that messing with nature is a prominent
public concern (Carr and Palmer, 2012).
Reﬂecting on the Experiment Earth? ﬁndings, however, Corner
et al. (2012) cautioned against interpreting too simplistically the
idea that some geoengineering technologies were more ‘natural’
than others, as the framing of the different technologies by the
group facilitators may have unintentionally introduced this idea to
participants. The analogies used to describe certain technologies
alluded very strongly to a ‘naturalness’, while others did not. For
example, chemical vents for capturing carbon dioxide from the air
were repeatedly described as ‘artiﬁcial trees’, while the release of
sulphur particles into the stratosphere was reported to partici-
pants as being ‘no different to a volcano’. While these character-
isations might be technically accurate, they also provide a
powerful framing: that the way to think about these technologies
is by analogy to existing ‘natural’ processes.In the current paper, we attempt to go beyond the ﬁndings of
previous geoengineering public engagement research by providing
the ﬁrst in-depth examination of public views about how
geoengineering technologies relate to nature, exploring the
reasons why ‘messing with nature’ is such a powerful narrative
in public perceptions of geoengineering, and examining the
multiple ways in which people conceptualise geoengineering’s
relationship with the natural world.
3. Methodology
Following a pilot study in Cardiff, four one day deliberative
workshops were conducted in four different cities in the UK:
Birmingham, Cardiff, Glasgow and Norwich. Deliberative work-
shops are a form of facilitated group discussion that provide
participants with the opportunity to consider an issue in depth,
and are widely used in qualitative research exploring public
perceptions of emerging areas of science and technology (e.g.,
Chilvers, 2010; Dietz and Stern, 2008; Corner and Pidgeon, 2012;
Davies et al., 2009; Pidgeon et al., 2009, 2013; Rowe et al., 2005;
Stilgoe, 2007). Although the current research contained several
innovative methodological features, the design was guided by
recent deliberative workshops that the authors conducted
(Pidgeon et al., 2009, 2013), and took the form of an invited
micro-deliberation (that is, deliberation among a relatively small
group of invited participants for a relatively limited duration of
time), a methodology that European social researchers have
successfully experimented with for over 20 years (e.g. Chilvers,
2010; Pidgeon et al., 2013).
Each workshop was attended by 11 participants, (n = 44).
Participants were recruited through a professional recruitment
agency. Criteria used to recruit a spread of participants included
gender, age, socio-economic groupings, educational level, ethnicity
and geographic location of participants. This approach was
designed to ensure that a diverse range of viewpoints would be
included in each workshop. Importantly, recruitment was ‘topic
blind’, with the term ‘geoengineering’ not mentioned during the
recruitment process; instead participants were recruited to take
part in discussions related to ‘societal responses to climate change’.
Participants were given a monetary honorarium for their
participation.
The workshops were facilitated by the authors and took place
over the course of one day. There were several stages to the day
including: (1) an overview of climate change involving a
presentation by facilitators and a whole group discussion by
participants; (2) World Cafe´ style small group discussion of
responses (i.e. mitigation followed by adaptation followed by
geoengineering) to climate change. In this and throughout each of
the proceeding stages, participants were encouraged to generate
questions, comments and thoughts, to record these on large post-it
notes, and to place these post-it notes on a specially designed
‘question wall’; (3) whole group reﬂection and discussion of the
question wall allowing the participants to review the questions
generated by all of the small groups; (4) poster reading and poster
presentation of putative geoengineering technologies (CDR –
biological air capture and chemical air capture SRM–stratospheric
aerosols and cloud brightening). The posters were described as
depicting ‘ideas’ for technologies, rather than technologies per se,
and where artists’ impressions were used, we explicitly and
repeatedly described them as such. The posters presented
information without any steer as to whether the idea might
constitute an advantage or a disadvantage; (5) small group
discussion using a series of short ‘quotes’ representing different
perspectives (e.g. the idea that engaging in even desk research on
geoengineering would mean a slippery slope to deployment) about
geoengineering. These quotes were adapted by the research team
A. Corner et al. / Global Environmental Change 23 (2013) 938–947942from genuine excerpts found in written articles about geoengi-
neering and were designed to ﬂush out any opinions that had not
spontaneously emerged throughout the previous sessions; and (6)
ﬁnal whole group reﬂection of the question wall.
It should be noted that a key stage in the design and preparation
of these workshops was an extensive and thorough methodologi-
cal review of the ‘Experiment Earth?’ project (Ipsos MORI, 2009),
the original recordings of which the research team was granted
access to. This permitted us to learn from the ‘Experiment Earth?’
process, and we subsequently published a methodological critique
and review of the project (Corner et al., 2011). One of the key
ﬁndings in our analysis was that the ‘Experiment Earth’ facilitators
had, unintentionally, frequently presented information about
particular geoengineering technologies as being more or less
‘natural’ (e.g., describing stratospheric aerosol injection as
operating in the same way as volcanoes), or geoengineering in
general as something to be used in a climatic ‘emergency’ (Corner
et al., 2011). We were extremely mindful in the current research,
therefore, to avoid strong framings such as these (until the very last
session of the day in which we introduced a range of possible
framings, explicitly, and asked participants to critically engage
with them).
All of the workshops were, with participants’ informed consent,
digitally audio and video recorded. Audio recordings were then
transcribed by a professional transcription company and anon-
ymised, with original names of participants being replaced with
pseudonyms. The transcripts were analysed with a view to
identifying the most important themes and issues, with no prior
expectations as to what these themes would be. Through an
iterative process of reading, thematic coding (guided by existing
literature as well as the data themselves), and reﬂection, a wide
range of core themes were identiﬁed, including ideas around the
governance of geoengineering, the risk of military conﬂict,
perceived links between materialism/consumption and the need
for geoengineering, concern over unintended consequences and
the individual features of particular technologies.
We do not seek to capture the entirety of the data in the current
publication, but rather to focus on one particular concept which
emerged from the analysis–‘messing with nature’ - which was a
frequently-invoked, diversely interpreted and semantically rich
theme that bridged and linked to many other ideas and issues–
despite the fact that it was never introduced to participants
(implicitly or explicitly).
4. Results and discussion: messing with nature?
Analysis of the four deliberative workshops revealed a wide
range of views and perspectives on both climate change and
geoengineering as a response to climate change, which are
described in a separate report (currently in preparation by the
authors). But one narrative stood out above all others, and also
seemed to play an anchoring, organising and bridging role in
linking to other key themes: the (contested) idea that geoengi-
neering means ‘messing with nature’.
Our analysis of the data was conducted with a view to
identifying – through the application of key theoretical ideas about
how humans relate to nature – dominant themes and trends that
could be interpreted in light of the extensive literature outlined in
previous sections of this paper. In every group, the ‘messing with
nature’ theme was raised by participants unprompted, (as well as in
response to framings introduced by the researchers subsequently),
suggesting that this was indeed a key determinant of participants’
views and perspectives. As we discuss and analyse our key
ﬁndings, we have attempted to link the data to the complex
existing literature on how humans relate to nature, but also to
identify ways in which geoengineering may point to newdimensions in the relationship between humans and nature.
Our analysis is divided into ﬁve broad themes, all based on a
different strand of the central theme of ‘messing with nature’.
4.1. Preserving or threatening nature
Does geoengineering represent an unprecedented, or unac-
ceptable interference in nature? This question – or variants of it
– underpinned a considerable amount of discourse in all four
workshops. As the following analysis makes clear, participants
interpreted and explored the relationship between geoengineer-
ing and the concept of nature in an extremely wide variety of
ways.
Although many scholars contest whether a primordial nature
exists independent of society (e.g. FitzSimmons, 1989; Mac-
naghten and Urry, 1998), our participants’ ways of speaking about
nature suggests that they (at least in part) conceptualise nature as
being distinct from society. This is highlighted throughout all of the
analysis themes and most especially through the ways that
participants suggested that the appropriate human role in
combatting climate change was to work with nature rather than
against it, setting humans apart from nature and casting them as
stewards not only for the planet now, but for future generations:
‘‘Nature really has got its own balance hasn’t it? Its only the
human input that has created much of this problem, so if you
can get nature to do the best it can, I mean use nature. . .the
whole idea is to keep nature doing what nature does’’ (Fiona,
Birmingham)
However, there were mixed feelings about whether geoengi-
neering could be considered as a means of working with nature – to
restore it – or whether intervening in the climatic system
inevitably meant disrupting nature. One participant felt that there
was a level of comfort to be derived from geoengineering, in the
sense that it suggested a pathway towards stabilising the earth for
future generations:
‘‘You know I might not be around when this lot (the four
posters) happens but I’d like to think that there’s something in
process, something to keep the planet safe for future genera-
tions and I think that’s how you should be thinking more’’
(Rebecca, Birmingham).
But other participants saw geoengineering in precisely the
opposite way – as a distraction from more ‘natural’ ways of
responding to climate change:
‘‘The object is not to create damage, that’s surely, we want to
reduce the damage we’re doing to the planet, you know, and the
scientists should be looking at a kind of natural way of doing it, a
better way of using say, the sun, you know, the resources that
will not cause any knock-on damage in the future’’ (George,
Glasgow).
These divergent views about geoengineering’s status in relation
to nature–either as a means of ‘preserving’ nature, or as a threat to
it – underscore the socially constructed character of ‘nature’
(Castree and Braun, 2001), but also demonstrate the complexity of
the concept of geoengineering. Faced with the very same prospect
(intervention in the Earth’s climate), different participants reached
very different conclusions about whether this represented a help
or a hindrance to natural systems. In contrast to the role that
perceived naturalness has played in views about GM crops, or
animal cloning (where violations of the natural order are
unequivocally considered to be negative by those who raise this
as a concern–see, e.g., Sjo¨berg, 2004; Marris, 2001), geoengineer-
ing’s relationship (or at least, its perceived relationship) to the
natural order seems more subtle.
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A commonly held concern was that however society responded
to climate change, it had to be based on developing a level of
security for future generations, with participants frequently
referring to their faith in younger generations to respond more
pro-actively than they had. However, the view that geoengineering
would necessarily make the future safer was highly contested.
Here, the issue of ﬁddling with natural systems played a key role,
with a cautionary narrative playing out in several of the workshops
centring on the suggestion that messing with nature meant storing
up problems for future generations. Interestingly–given that CDR
techniques have been found to be more popular than SRM
technologies (e.g., Spence et al., 2010)–the prospect of storing
carbon dioxide under ground seemed to be the most common
trigger for concerns about the impact of geoengineering on future
generations:
‘‘. . .you’re messing with nature basically, do people know what
are the long term effects? Because if there’s still carbon
underground you may be storing up problems for future
generations’’ (Robert, Glasgow)
In fact, as well as expressing an interest in the welfare of future
generations, many participants felt strongly that we should learn
lessons from the past, particularly with regard to previous
attempts to alter natural systems. Typically, the example people
used to illustrate this was deforestation:
‘‘You’re talking about changing their nature aren’t you? You’re
changing nature on deforestation. . .Its not about money,
carbon, it’s the whole concept of nature. You’re eradicating
endless species of plants, potentially animals. . .’’ (Graham,
Birmingham)
Concerns like these seem to speak directly to McKibben’s
suggestion (2003) that our level of inﬂuence over that natural
world has reached such a degree that it has begun to shift the very
idea of what ‘nature’ means. On several occasions, deforestation
was identiﬁed as an example of irrevocably changing a natural
process and as a lesson in the sorts of unintended consequences
that experimentation with natural systems could bring:
‘‘Because they tore down the rain forests and look at the
pressures we’ve got with that now. You know, we’ve learnt from
that so we’ve got to learn from the mistakes we’ve made
before. . .’’ (Mel, Glasgow)
4.3. Nature bites back
The notion of unexpected consequences was one of the most
popular topics of discussion in all four workshops. Frequently this
bridged directly to concerns about interfering with nature. Several
illuminating metaphors and analogies were utilised by participants
to explain their concerns about the unanticipated consequences of
geoengineering that could prove difﬁcult to control. For example,
one participant expressed reservations about rushing into a
situation where we were committed to long term natural effects:
‘‘We’re going to get Mother Nature here, so we don’t, its not like
ﬂicking a switch, so that’s why we need to take it easy, you
know, slowly to see what the side effects are’’ (Glasgow)
The same participant then followed up this general point with a
metaphor about Frankenstein’s monster, and the temptation to
abuse the control that geoengineering might one day provide:
‘‘It’s a bit like Frankenstein’s monster, if you could control
climates to that extent they’d be saying ‘Right I’m going on myholidays to the Bahamas, I never want it to rain there’’’ (Mel,
Glasgow)
Analogies like these intimate the possibility that nature might
‘bite back’ and like Frankenstein’s monster, take revenge if
provoked. Such a characterisation is a classic literary narrative,
with Frankenstein’s monster one of many iconic examples of the
dangers of messing with nature in folklore and popular ﬁction
(Schelde, 1993; see also Hansen, 2006). Analogies are used
frequently by those particularly concerned by developments like
GMOs, nanotechnologies and now geoengineering. Indeed, in
contestation about GMOs, those against would often refer to GMOs
as ‘Frankenfoods’. Schurman (2004) argued that such metaphors
were used successfully to resist powerful commercial entities’
attempts to make GMOs commercially viable in Western Europe.
Participants also found non-ﬁctional analogies for the potential
of geoengineering to bring about unanticipated consequences –
despite the reassurances of the scientiﬁc and political community.
Here, it is clear that previous experience of promissory or even
hyperbolic narratives around science and technology have led to a
certain degree of cynicism around the claims made by scientists
about new technologies:
‘‘Look what scientists have done with the rabbits; myxomatosis.
I mean if they’d have done that on a small scale then we
wouldn’t have the problem we’ve got today with rabbits. Here
we are what, I don’t know, 60 or 70 years later and still got myxi.
You know they said that would be all right, you know ‘we’ll just
cull the rabbit. . .’’. (James, Norwich)
Comparisons with both ﬁctional and real examples such as
these are a powerful way for participants to express their concerns
about how geoengineering may interact with the physical
environment. In fact, as the above examples show, the scale and
scope of geoengineering proposals seemed to lead several
participants to discuss geoengineering technologies in terms of
moral lessons – almost fable-like – learnt from the stories of
human experience.
4.4. Nature and society (in)balance
One important way in which our participants linked geoengi-
neering and nature was through a perception of geoengineering as
representative of a society that is out of synch – or not living in
harmony – with nature. In each of the four groups (without
prompting), the idea that society had become more materialistic,
greedy, selﬁsh or wasteful was raised. Typically, this would be
mentioned in the very ﬁrst conversation about climate change, and
would often be accompanied by a cynicism that the citizens of
industrialised nations would be willing to address this in order to
make their lifestyles more sustainable. However, while the link
between mitigation (via lifestyle change) and materialism is clear,
what was more surprising was the extent to which deliberating
about geoengineering also triggered many comments about the
wasteful nature of society.
One participant’s ﬁrst response to geoengineering was that it
was only needed because‘‘. . .(P)eople won’t stop being greedy,
because people won’t stop having cars’’ (Shona, Norwich).
For some, the fact that geoengineering was even being
discussed was an indictment on society’s inability to rein in
consumption, and by extension, an inability to live harmoniously
with natural processes that provided natural boundaries and limits
on human consumption and activity. Mirroring the logic of the
Limits to Growth rhetoric that was considered to have exerted such
a formidable inﬂuence almost four decades ago (Dryzek, 1997), a
consideration of geoengineering seems to trigger – at least for
some participants – a rejection of the idea that consumption rates
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One interesting interpretation of the question of whether
geoengineering represented an unjustiﬁed interference in natural
systems came from a participant in Cardiff, who suggested that
worrying about messing with nature sounded like a quasi-religious
perspective. For this participant – who described concerns about
ﬁddling with nature as naı¨ve, uninformed, archaic and nonsensical
– the idea that there was a natural order, which humans shouldn’t
interfere with, was not credible:
‘‘Because when you’re talking about either a natural or a
manmade phenomenon, the sort of, the natural way of things
happening could be construed to be its because of God’s will.
That’s not my view, but that’s what I was expecting. I ﬁnd it
refreshing that it hasn’t come in, to be honest.’’ (Martyn, Cardiff)
The equation of naturalness to the ‘natural order’ of a world
controlled by God, rather than humans, underscores the complex-
ity of the naturalness concept: it can signify both the physical
environment (something amenable to scientiﬁc enquiry and
testing) or a meta-physical entity (something beyond human
comprehension or control). Previous research has hinted at an
important link between the religious sense of a natural order, and
perceptions of biotechnology and nanotechnologies. For example,
Scheufele et al. (2008) found that religiosity negatively predicted
whether US citizens agreed that nanotechnologies were morally
acceptable. Nanotechnology – the manipulation of matter at the
molecular level – was seen as violating a normative boundary
between the natural (human) and supernatural realm. How those
with religious beliefs react to geoengineering as public awareness
grows is an interesting question.
Related to Martyn’s views that concerns about interfering in
nature were archaic or naive, other participants felt that it was
hypocritical to claim that messing with nature was bad, when that
was exactly what humans had been doing for centuries. On this
view, geoengineering is simply an extreme example of how
humans have always sought to inﬂuence the natural world–at the
other end of a spectrum that begins with mundane activities like
mowing the lawn, building a house or killing animals for food.
Some participants felt that intentionally messing with nature was
precisely what was needed in order to redress the balance we had
unintentionally disrupted through carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sions:
‘‘It’s going to affect Mother Nature, and we’ve been doing that
for the past 20/30 years and it’s when it suits us, and when we
accept it, then it’s OK, and then it’s the next thing, that’s messing
with. . .we’ve been doing that from the start and if it’s going to
be something for the beneﬁt, and all this, for the country, you
know, then it has to be done’’ (Mike, Glasgow)
In this regard, the perceived relationship between geoengineer-
ing and the natural order seems more subtle than that observed for
other areas of emerging technologies, where discussion about
interfering with nature has also been common. Davies and
Macnaghten (2010) identiﬁed messing with nature as a narrative
in debates about nanotechnologies that implied ‘‘. . .orders and
boundaries that should – generally – be left alone. . .being
dangerously messed with, blurred and transformed. . .’’ (p. 147).
Whilst some participants in our workshops held this view about
geoengineering, others like Mike, challenged it, arguing that it was
hypocritical to fret about the violation of natural boundaries in the
context of geoengineering, when so many other human activities
were predicated on precisely this process.
Other participants suggested that geoengineering could be
thought of as ‘‘giving nature a helping hand’’ (Helen, Cardiff), or as
‘‘reversing the messing that we’ve already done’’ (Rose, Norwich).One individual argued that geoengineering might more accurately
be described as ﬁxing the climate–undoing the damage humans
have so far caused:
‘‘We’ve messed with nature: we put stuff up there. So it’s our
responsibility to get it back, to help nature to repair itself’’
(Martyn, Cardiff)
However for some participants what distinguished geoengineer-
ing from other forms of human intervention was not necessarily the
blurring of boundaries, but the intentionality behind it:
‘‘And what we said earlier on (to) unintentionally mess with
Mother Nature, I think it’s a whole different ball game than
messing with it intentionally’’ (Robert, Glasgow)
Participants’ concerns about intentionality map directly onto
philosophical commentary (e.g., Jamieson, 1996) that identiﬁes
intentionality as one of the key features that demarcates geoengi-
neering from other (unintended) interventions in the climate
system. And as several commentators have observed (e.g., Stilgoe,
2011), the motivations of scientists are likely to matter to members
of the public in the context of geoengineering technologies (see also
Parkhill et al., 2013). While volcanic eruptions may have ‘acciden-
tally’ trialled the sorts of particles that stratospheric aerosol
injection might one day utilise, the fact that solar radiation means
actively – rather than inadvertently – managing the climate is likely
to prove important in determining public views on the subject.
4.5. Regenesis of nature
Earlier, we argued certain geoengineering technologies had
been (unintentionally) given a strong framing of naturalness in
previous public engagement exercises (Corner et al., 2011).
However, when this frame was not provided – as in the current
research – participants views on what did and did not constitute a
‘natural’ form of geoengineering differed. Although some echoed
the views obtained in Experiment Earth? (that sequestering carbon
using biochar was more natural than spraying chemicals into the
stratosphere), others rejected the idea that even SRM technologies
constituted ‘messing with nature’ when compared to other
technologies like genetic modiﬁcation and ‘cloning’:
‘‘. . .messing with nature is like cloning or something. . .whereas
going out and putting droplets in the air to increase
reﬂect. . .that’s. . .its not that same. . .even though its, its
artiﬁcial: but nature has a surface in the air. It doesn’t have a
sheep that’s identical to another sheep.’’ (Lisa, Cardiff)
This is an interesting twist on the more dominant view that
geoengineering represents an unacceptable interference with
nature – here, SRM geoengineering is construed as relatively
compatible with natural processes because it at least operates
within pre-existing natural systems. Comments like these suggest
that although geoengineering shares certain characteristics with
other emerging and contested technologies, there may also be
ways in which the prospect of controlling the climate is unique.
Although the idea of messing with nature was most prominent
in discussions about geoengineering, the structure of the workshop
– with a design that ‘funnelled’ discussion from climate change,
through responses to climate change, and ﬁnally to geoengineering
as one possible societal response – meant that many of the points
made in relation to geoengineering had been touched on earlier in
the day. For example, Lorna from Birmingham responded quite
sceptically to adaptation as a response to climate change,
commenting:
‘‘You can’t defy nature at the end of the day can you?[. . .] the
Earth is self-cleansing and whatever you do isn’t going to help’’.
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another participant:
‘‘When I see all this I just think of the fact, you know, the
magnitude of nature on man and we can put these steps in place
but it makes me feel quite small and vulnerable because if
they’re putting those things in place, and I’m sure that’s
probably not enough, you know, in generations’ time this won’t
be the case, I think it was going to be on a far greater scale and I
just think that we. . .you can never overcome nature in as far as
it’s more powerful than we are. . .’’ (Eloise, Norwich)
Another participant in the group agreed that the Earth ‘knows’ it
has a problem and that it might adjust for this by causing a major
extinction event (as they suggested had happened in prehistoric
times). This kind of view – representing an almost fatalistic
conception of the all-powerfulness of nature – was widely shared
among participants across all four groups, to a greater or lesser
degree. This meant that while most people saw the beneﬁt of trying
to prevent dangerous climate change, with some even viewing it as
a moral imperative, there was a signiﬁcant amount of cynicism
underpinning these views, and a belief that nature would ‘take its
course’:
Alison: I do believe the earth has got its own methods of. . .I see
man as almost, I know it sounds awful, like a disease on the
earth, now that sounds awful really but we are like a disease,
we’re increasing, increasing, increasing and we’re using, using,
using and it’s almost like a. . .
Ian: Like a rash.
Tony: Like a cancer.
Alison: . . .like a rash that’s it, all over the earth and we’re taking,
taking but I do. . .there’s something deep inside of me which I’ve
got no logic for that the earth will actually. . .
Heather: Cleanse itself.
Glenda: . . .do something that will actually. . .it will try and
balance that out, it always wins. It always wins somehow, you
know.
Ian: That’s Mother Nature.
(Birmingham)
5. Conclusion
It is well known that perceived naturalness makes technologies
more or less acceptable to people (Pidgeon et al., 2012; Sjo¨berg,
2000, 2004; Slovic, 2000), so it is perhaps not surprising that
‘nature’ played a central role in the way that the participants in the
current study deliberated about geoengineering, and its social and
ethical consequences. In the current paper, however, we have
documented a more subtle set of discourses than the dichotomous
proposition that nature is good and therefore messing with it must
be bad. Almost every aspect of the relationship between
geoengineering and nature was contested to some degree: for
every individual who considered control of the climate to
represent a dangerous and ill-conceived intervention, there was
another who viewed climatic control as something unavoidably
necessary, or not qualitatively different to other, more mundane
human-nature interactions like farming. Hansen (2006) has
suggested that invoking ‘nature’ seems to ‘‘inoculate against
criticism or further scrutiny and to invest partisan arguments and
interests with moral or universal authority and legitimacy’’
(Hansen, 2006, p. 813). With regards to our participants’ discourse,this also seems to be true, as those with positive or negative
perceptions of geoengineering invoked conceptualisations of
nature that matched their perspectives.
Although there was almost universal acknowledgement that
geoengineering meant that natural systems would be interfered
with, there was no consensus about whether this was a good or bad
thing. Perhaps this is because the context for geoengineering – its
justiﬁcation in the ﬁrst place – is different to that of most emerging
technologies. The dominant narrative surrounding geoengineer-
ing–that it may be a necessary ‘Plan B’, in case our other option fails
and we are faced with a climatic emergency – has a great deal more
urgency than the dominant narratives around nanotechnologies,
or even agricultural biotechnologies. Clearly, there are proposed
beneﬁts to nanotechnologies or GM crops, and potentially
transformative applications to social problems like the
manufacturing of cheap, nutritious food. But there is nothing
analogous to the ‘climate emergency’ driving the development of
nanotechnologies or GM crops: they are not, for the most part,
framed in the same way that geoengineering is (although
proponents of GM sometimes claim that it would solve or
drastically reduce world hunger).
All of this suggests that the framing of geoengineering will
play a critical role in the way it is perceived, and how the public
view it in relation to ‘nature’ (see Bellamy et al., 2012). As Corner
et al. (2011) have argued, framing effects can have a powerful
impact on public perceptions of geoengineering. Presenting
geoengineering as a possible response to a climatic emergency is
problematic, especially if linked to the need to conduct research
at an early stage, as it provides a very strong framing of necessity,
which could artiﬁcially enhance the acceptability of conducting
research into these technologies (for more discussion of the
ethical implications of framing SRM technologies, see Scott,
2012).
A related point that emerged from our ﬁndings is that when we
avoided describing particular geoengineering technologies using
analogies to natural processes, there was no consensus about
whether any one particular geoengineering approach was more or
less ‘natural’. This suggests that the perceived naturalness of
geoengineering technologies discussed in previous studies (e.g.,
Ipsos-MORI, 2010) may have more to do with the way in which
different technologies were framed and described, than their
actual physical characteristics (see also Corner et al., 2011).
As many scholars have argued, most new technological
innovations are considered ‘artiﬁcial’ at ﬁrst (and subsequently
become naturalised – see, e.g., discussion in Macnaghten and Urry,
1998). According to this argument, there is no categorical
difference between the invention of small-holder agriculture
(now an iconic representation of ‘natural’ activity) and modern
innovations like cloning. But just because historical and sociologi-
cal analyses reveal that the concept of nature is not static, this does
not mean that there is no such thing as the concept of ‘nature’ from
a psychological perspective (see, e.g., De Groot and Steg, 2008). It is
a temporally dynamic category, certainly, and one that has fuzzy
and contested boundaries. But, as dozens of studies in cognitive
science and psychology demonstrate, this does not prevent a
category from possessing powerful psychological appeal (e.g.,
Osherson et al., 1990).
For the participants in our study, the contested concept of
nature certainly did seem to possess psychological appeal, and
exerted an impact on multiple discourses, as we have described
above. As the dynamic conceptual window of ‘nature’ moves to
incorporate and exclude new technological developments and
human artefacts, so novel questions are raised. The prospect of
geoengineering may not be qualitatively different from the
unintentional climatic changes produced by human activity since
the industrial revolution. But from the perspective of our
A. Corner et al. / Global Environmental Change 23 (2013) 938–947946participants, it is certainly different in scale and in scope. Concerns
about the capacity of human technologies to interfere with nature
may be in some senses unremarkable, but the speciﬁc issues that
geoengineering raises – the physical and social implications of
taking global control of the climatic system – are not. In the same
way, therefore, that the possibility of cloning raises novel
questions about what it means for something to be human, so
the prospect of geoengineering suggests new imaginations of the
way that humans relate to the natural world.
One unexpected aspect of the debates about geoengineering
and nature was the particular salience of concerns about the
increasing materialism of modern society. Perhaps, they represent
a deeper expression of concern about the continuation of an
industrial project that is now known to have had a signiﬁcantly
negative impact on many aspects of the ‘natural’ environment.
Geoengineering does nothing to address unsustainable patterns of
resource consumption: SRM approaches do not even reduce levels
of CO2. Concerns about the un-naturalness of geoengineering may
in fact be symbolic of a deeper concern regarding whether
geoengineering is a sustainable (in the broadest sense of the word)
solution to climate change. If the promise of geoengineering
detracts attention away from establishing more sustainable
consumption and production patterns, then it could be seen as
antithetical to valuing nature.
The wide variety of ways in which people in our workshops
conceptualised and debated the relationship between geoengi-
neering and the natural world suggests that this will be a key factor
determining public views on the topic as awareness of it grows.
Geoengineering – the prospect of control over the global
thermostat – may usher in new ways to think about nature. As
Preston (2012) puts it:
‘‘(Nature) has served as a canvas against which humans have
searched for, and found, meaning in their lives. . .(T)aking
control of this background context of our lives would be
psychologically challenging due to the immense burden it
would impose on us. There would be no place on earth – or
under the sky – where anxiety-producing questions such as ‘Are
we succeeding?’ could be avoided.’’ (Preston, 2012, p. 198)
If – as many scientists now claim – we have entered the
anthropocene, then what impact will this have on public
perspectives on the appropriate human role in relation to the
natural world? The popular science writer Mark Lynas offers one
answer in his provocatively titled book The God Species (2011).
Lynas argues that as we are now equipped with the knowledge of
planetary boundaries which cannot safely be transgressed, we are
under an obligation to ‘play God’ and stay within them. An
opposing view is offered by the philosopher Clive Hamilton (2010),
who argues that our increasingly sophisticated scientiﬁc under-
standing of the Earth and its resource limitations behoves us to
withdraw from our dominant position with regards to nature.
These two opposing views suggest that humans have either an
obligation to respect, or a mandate to pro-actively manage
planetary boundaries. But if the concept of the anthropocene is
to be taken seriously, it suggests that preserving nature may
increasingly become indistinguishable from preserving human
civilisation.
Just as a growing awareness of climate change has forced us to
reconsider our relationship with the natural systems that sustain
us, geoengineering may also remould the way we relate to and
value nature. The ﬁndings from our deliberative workshops
suggest that the perceived relationship between geoengineering
and nature is multi-faceted, complex, but also central to
understanding how public perceptions of this emerging socio-
scientiﬁc issue are likely to develop. As knowledge of geoengineer-
ing grows, and debates about its social and ethical implicationsproliferate, it seems likely that the concept of nature–and whether
geoengineering represents an unprecedented level of intervention
into the natural world–will play an important role in the
discourses of publics.
The challenge for researchers conducting public engagement
research – and policy-makers faced with the task of incorporating
public and stakeholder views into decisions about funding
research and developing geoengineering technologies – is to
understand the complexity of the relationship between public
perceptions of geoengineering and their views on ‘nature’. There is
a danger here – as happened with GM – that concerns about the
potential of geoengineering to ‘mess’ with nature will simply be
dismissed as anti-science, or irrational. Such a development would
miss the range of nuanced views presented in the current paper,
which show that hidden beneath the seemingly simple colloquium
‘messing with nature’ are a range of perspectives that collectively
offer a sophisticated critique of the implications that geoengineer-
ing may have for planet earth, and the roles that human societies
play on it.
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